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Comments on Professor Peroni's Paper on
Reform of the U.S. International
Income Tax Rules
DAVID R. TILLINGHAST*
This paper, due to space considerations, will focus on Professor
Peroni's discussion concerning the imposition of tax on the foreign
income derived by resident taxpayers through foreign entities.
Initially, the basic question is whether income from capital is to be
taxed at all. Professor Peroni assumes that it will, and I do not disagree.
But there are others, such as Malcolm Gammie, who believe that it is
administratively infeasible to impose a tax on internationally mobile
capital, or on the income derived therefrom, and conclude from this that
capital and capital income should not be taxed at all.'
This position has always struck me as unacceptable as a matter of
social and political policy. In the era of a widening gulf between rich
and poor, I cannot imagine that wage earners (and real estate owners)
should entirely bear the cost of government, while entrepreneurs such as
Bill Gates, for example, contribute nothing. Nevertheless, this argument
suggests two relevant points. The first, of course, is that much simplic-
ity could in fact be achieved by simply exempting capital income from
tax. The second point, more relevant here, is that effective enforcement
of a residence-based tax on international income is highly problematic.
Foreign income is often derived through complex legal structures.
Moreover, as Dan Frisch aptly pointed out several years ago,2 the mix of
international flows includes a growing component of portfolio invest-
ment. Anyone who has contemplated how to enforce compliance with
"treaty-shopping" limitations on reduction of withholding taxes on port-
folio dividends,3 or has struggled to advise a client with respect to a
second- or third-tier corporation which is or may be a Passive Foreign
Investment Company,4 can attest to the difficulties involved. The advent
of cyberspace can only make the situation dramatically worse.
* Chadbourne & Parke LLP, New York; University of Miami School of Law International
Tax Institute.
1. See, e.g., Gammie, The Global Future of Income Tax, Int'l Bull., Fiscal Doc. (Nov.Dec.
1996).
2. See Daniel J. Frisch, The Economics of International Tax Policy: Some Old and New
Approaches, 47 TAX NoTEs 581, 587 (1990).
3. See David R. Tillinghast, Tax Treaty Issues, 50 U. MIAMI L. REv. 455, 465-67 (1996).
4. See I.R.C. § 1297(a)(2), (b)(5) (1982).
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Absent a quantum leap in the level of available administrative
resources and inter-governmental cooperation, we must face the fact
that, at a time when tax morality is hardly at its zenith, the enforcement
of far-reaching "look-through" rules, designed to prevent resident tax-
payers from sheltering otherwise taxable income in offshore entities, can
be spotty at best. The rules will apply only to those who voluntarily
comply with them and those who are discovered in exceptional
circumstances.
The issue is whether such a situation is preferable to one in which
the very attempt to tax international income flows is abandoned as hope-
less. Like Professor Peroni, I am persuaded that it is; however, this is a
central issue which precedes virtually all discussion about taxing inter-
national income flows.
Professor Peroni correctly emphasizes that the concept of capital
import neutrality must be understood in a broad range of cases to imply
exemption or near exemption from tax, simply because participants in
international markets have such a broad range of choices in sourcing
income and many countries seem more than happy to accommodate
them. A rapidly expanding sector of international commerce involves
the provision of information services, which have no inherent source. (I
was intrigued to learn, for example, that Guyana has become the major
source of available on-line pornography.) 5 Beyond this, moreover, the
explosion in communications technology makes it feasible in many
cases to have services physically performed wherever this seems advan-
tageous. And even in the case of "hard goods" and manufacturing, the
range of locational choice continually increases.
The danger of a "race to the bottom," as Professor McClure so
aptly put it,6 by countries anxious to attract investment through tax con-
cessions, is very real. One need look no further than to a relatively
respectable country, the Netherlands, for confirmation. Already offering
an attractive tax regime for holding companies, the Dutch have recently
introduced a highly concessional scheme for group finance companies 7
whose sole purpose is to attract multinational investment and income
flows to that country.
If one rejects the concept of capital import neutrality, one comes
quickly to Professor Peroni's argument for ending the deferral of U.S.
tax on the income which U.S. taxpayers derive through foreign entities.
5. See Cybersex: An Adult Affair, Tum ECONOMIST, Jan. 4, 1997, at 65.
6. Visions of Tax Systems in the Twenty-First Century, Address at the 50th Annual
Congress of the International Fiscal Association (Sept. 3, 1996) (forthcoming 1997).
7. See Maarten van der Weyden, Dick Hofland & Kees van Raad, Netherlands Tackles Tax-
Base Erosion and Proposes Measures to Improve Investment Climate, 12 TAX Noms INT'L 447
(1996).
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This requires dealing with direct investment on the one hand, and with
portfolio investment on the other, as these present quite different sorts of
issues. In general, I found Professor Peroni's proposals for a Controlled
Foreign Corporation ("CFC") regime to be sensible (if not politically
attainable). In particular, I would agree with his extending "look-
through" foreign tax credits to non-corporate shareholders in a CFC.
An issue which requires more attention, however, is how to treat a
U.S. person who is a substantial (direct) investor in a foreign corporation
which is controlled by a limited number of shareholders, but is not U.S.-
controlled. The prototype case is the frequently encountered one in
which a U.S. corporation enters into a joint venture with one or more
foreign corporations. Suppose that the U.S. corporation owns 50%, 25%
or 10% of a foreign joint venture company's stock, and that the remain-
der is owned by two foreign corporations having no U.S. ownership. If
the foreign entity were a partnership, the U.S. corporation (or, in the real
world, its participating subsidiary) would be taxed currently under Pro-
fessor Peroni's proposal. It seems that the result should be the same if it
is a corporation for U.S. tax purposes.
Stephen Shay would impose a current tax in this case (although he
does not fully define the circumstances in which his rule would apply).8
Professor Peroni would deal with this issue by denying indirect foreign
tax credits to a U.S. corporation holding such a participation unless the
corporation elected to include its share of the foreign corporation's
income currently. The problem is that in the case of tax haven opera-
tions, the loss of credits will be insignificant.
Since joint ventures, "strategic alliances," and the like, have
become an increasingly important part of the international scene, this
issue should be addressed. A decision must be made, of course, as to
where to draw the line between direct investment and portfolio invest-
ment. One idea would be to apply the controlled foreign corporation
definition9 regardless of whether the controlling persons are U.S. per-
sons. This would impose the tax only on a 10% or greater holder, and
the existence of concentrated control of the foreign corporation would
give at least some assurance that the U.S. participant(s) would be able to
command distributions, if necessary, to fund their U.S. tax burdens.
Further, I was not entirely satisfied with Professor Peroni's propos-
als for dealing with portfolio investment. I would agree that the way to
address this issue is to modify the Passive Foreign Investment Company
8. See Stephen E. Shay, Revisiting U.S. Anti-Deferral Rules, 74 TAxES 1042, 1061 (1996).
9. I.R.C. § 957(a) (1982) (defining a controlled foreign corporation as one in which a U.S.
person or persons, each owning at least 10% of the voting shares, together own more than 50% of
the total voting power or value).
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("PFIC") provisions of existing law, but I would modify them in a dif-
ferent way. To begin with, I think that we need to focus on the defini-
tional structure. A common, if banal, aphorism among practitioners is
that every foreign corporation is a PFIC. If not literally true, this adage
does reflect the fact that the PFIC rules are overreaching in the sense
that they apply (or may apply) to a very large number of foreign corpo-
rations that are nothing like the offshore investment companies at which
Congress originally took aim. To take only the simplest example, the
"once-a-PFIC-always-a-PFIC" rule' 0 makes the PFIC regime applicable
to many foreign corporations which engage in an active business by any
reasonable standard, and has the effect of deterring U.S. portfolio invest-
ment in foreign "start-up" situations. (For a variety of reasons, the
existing "start-up" exception is not adequate.)" There are other areas
(such as multi-corporate real estate enterprises) in which the statute or
the regulations seem too restrictive.
Beyond this badly needed clean-up, the major issue is how to tax a
U.S. shareholder in a PFIC. I am dubious about Professor Peroni's pro-
posal to require current inclusion of a "deemed rate of return" in cases
where the U.S. shareholders have insufficient information to compute an
actual pro rata share of the PFIC's income. There is no doubt that this
addresses a critical problem. My experience (and I believe that other
practitioners share it) is that a U.S. shareholder in a PFIC will elect
current inclusion wherever possible, because the "deferral with interest
charge" inclusion rules are considered a greater evil, and the inability to
persuade the foreign corporation to supply the necessary information
statement12 is, in practice, the principal obstacle to current inclusion.
But taxing the U.S. shareholder on imputed income raises some rather
fundamental issues.
The existing PFIC rules were premised on the idea that compelling
(as opposed to permitting) a U.S. taxpayer to pay tax on corporate
income that is not distributed-and which the taxpayer cannot cause to
be distributed by participating in a controlling shareholder group-raises
questions of fairness and possibly even legality.' 3 I have not examined
10. I.R.C. § 1297(b)(1) (1982). The impact of this rule can be avoided if the shareholder
makes a qualified electing fund election under I.R.C. § 1293, but in many cases this is not
feasible.
11. Under I.R.C. § 1297(b)(2), a corporation which would otherwise be a PFIC in the first
year it has gross income will not be so treated if it is not a PFIC in the two succeeding years. In
many "greenfield" foreign projects, there is an initial construction period in which the only
income the foreign corporation receives is interest on temporarily invested balances, so that 100%
of its gross income consists of passive income. This period frequently lasts more than one year.
See I.R.C § 1297(b)(2) (1982).
12. See I.R.S. Notice 88-125, 1988-2 C.B. 535 (1988).
13. See AMrRIcAN LAW INSTITUTE, INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES INCOME
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these issues recently and so I cannot speak to them. It is incumbent,
however, on those who propose current inclusion based upon an imputed
return to demonstrate that this appropriately comports with the concept
of an income tax.
Putting the question in less legalistic terms, the issue is whether the
simplicity gains achieved by imposing a current tax based upon a pre-
scribed interest rate are more meaningful than the inevitable unfairness
which will result. Surely, any prescribed rate of return will wildly
under-estimate the income of some, while wildly over-estimating the
income of others. To take an extreme example, imputing a rate of return
equal to three percentage points over the federal refund interest rate
would be confiscatory for a U.S. person who invested in a foreign
money market fund.
A question which Professor Peroni does not address is how he
would treat the disposition of shares by U.S. persons subject to the
imputed income regime. If a differential capital gains rate applied, a
benefit would accrue to the U.S. taxpayer whose share of the PFIC's
income has been under-reported. This could be accepted as an inevita-
ble glitch in the system. But what about the U.S. person whose share of
the PFIC's income has been overstated? Absent a special rule, that per-
son would suffer a capital loss, which could often be unusable. This
would systematically disadvantage portfolio investment abroad.
Requiring current inclusion based upon an imputed income does
not strike me as being necessarily the best way to deal with the problem
of PFIC inclusions. For example, much can be said for the "mark-to-
market" rule.1 4 It is true that the rule may complicate the statute,
because it will not apply in every case. It also requires the U.S. taxpayer
to forego capital gains benefits. But at the same time, it works rather
simply and equitably for a broad range of taxpayers that acquire shares
in quoted companies (and who may be thought, therefore, to be the least
devious of the investors with whom the PFIC rules must deal).
No doubt the residual PFIC inclusion rule, which defers the imposi-
tion of tax but imposes an interest charge, 15 is a highly complex and
imperfect taxing mechanism. There are a number of ways in which it
could be improved. For example, the assumption built into the rule that
any gain on disposition of PFIC shares accrued ratably over the holder's
holding period is harsh and irrational. What would be of great interest
would be a study of how a reformulated deferral rule would compare
TAxATION-PRoPOSALS ON UNITED STATES TAXATION OF FOREIGN PERSONS AND OF THE FOREIGN
INCOME OF UNTIED STATES PERSONS 188-92 (1987).
14. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1291-8, Fed. Reg. (1996).
15. I.R.C. § 1291 (1982).
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with a fleshed-out "deemed rate of return" rule. In my book, the formu-
lation of the PFIC regime could then include: (1) an elective current
inclusion rule based on the existing qualified electing fund election; (2)
an elective "mark-to-market" rule; and (3) one of the above alternatives
as the residual taxing rule. This three-tier structure would mirror the
technical amendment which has already been floated-except that the
third-tier rule might change.
